Value Receptacles

Noûs 49 (2):322-332 (2015)
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Abstract
Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not
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First archival date: 2013-03-08
Latest version: 3 (2020-05-30)
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Practical Ethics.Singer, Peter

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Conservative Value.Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan

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