Why Animals are Persons
Animal Sentience 1 (10):5-6 (2016)
Abstract
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CHEWAA
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-07-27
View upload history
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.Armstrong, D. M.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.Rosenthal, David M.
Consciousness and Experience.Lycan, William G.
Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.Shoemaker, Sydney S.
View all 11 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Added to PP index
2016-07-27
Total views
238 ( #18,626 of 50,187 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #23,017 of 50,187 )
2016-07-27
Total views
238 ( #18,626 of 50,187 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #23,017 of 50,187 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.
