Why Animals are Persons
Animal Sentience 1 (10):5-6 (2016)
Abstract
Rowlands’s case for attributing personhood to lower animals is ultimately convincing, but along the way he fails to highlight several distinctions that are crucial for his argument: Personhood vs. personal identity; the first person vs. its mental episodes; and pre- reflective awareness in general vs. one specific case of it.
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2016-07-27
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17 ( #46,230 of 72,524 )
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