Abstract

Some goals have special significance to agents. For instance, an agent could find her life worth living because she is pursuing her current goal, and the agent could also think that her previous life has no value because she did not pursue the current goal. If an agent’s current goal has special importance to the agent, then in terms of prudence the agent’s decision to obtain her current goal could be permissible even in the case where achieving her previous goal brings out larger advantages. A widely endorsed thesis of prudence (i.e. the temporal neutrality thesis) does not successfully explain this phenomenon of goal achievement. Furthermore, the present-aim thesis and the harmony thesis also fail in explaining why an agent has prudential reason to prioritize her current goal. This paper introduces a new thesis of prudence, according to which an agent’s caring is significant in deciding whether the agent’s actions are prudentially permissible. In particular, after introducing this thesis named the care thesis, I argue that the care thesis can explain why an agent has reason to prioritize her current goal if the agent finds her life worth living due to her current goal. It is permissible that an agent obtains her current goal rather than previous goal because achieving her current goal benefits the agent’s cared one (i.e. the self who pursues her current goal).