Cruelty, competency, and contemporary abolitionism

In A. Sarat (ed.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society. pp. 123-140 (2005)
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Abstract

After establishing that the requirement that those criminals who stand for execution be mentally competent can be given a recognizably retributivist rationale, I suggest that not only it is difficult to show that executing the incompetent is more cruel than executing the competent, but that opposing the execution of the incompetent fits ill with the recent abolitionist efforts on procedural concerns. I then propose two avenues by which abolitionists could incorporate such opposition into their efforts.

Author's Profile

Michael Cholbi
University of Edinburgh

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