Do No Harm: Notes on The Ethical Use of Nudges

Journal of Design Strategies 10 (1):86-99 (2021)
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Abstract

Advances in cognitive and behavioral science show that the way options are presented—commonly referred to as “choice architecture”—strongly influences our decisions: we tend to react to a particular option differently depending on how it is presented. Studies suggest that we often make irrational choices due to the interplay between choice architecture and systematic errors in our reasoning—cognitive biases. Based on this data, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein came up with the idea of a "nudge," which they define as a small change in the choice architecture that steers people towards certain choices without limiting their options. Central to the debate on nudging is the question of when, or under what circumstances, it is ethical to nudge someone. Proponents of nudging argue that for ethical nudging, the nudge must be (1) easy to resist and (2) aimed towards the welfare of those nudged (nudgees). In this paper, I argue that this criterion excludes nudges that are both intuitively permissible and broadly accepted. I propose an alternative set of sufficient conditions for ethical nudging that expands the domain for the ethical application of nudges. My “no harm” criterion states that for a nudge to be ethical, the nudge must (1) be easy to resist, and (2) produce no significant harm for the nudgee. I identify three types of such nudges: Choice Architect nudges, Third Party nudges, and “Meh” nudges, and offer examples for each.

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Valerie Joly Chock
Fordham University

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