Paternalism and Duties to Self

In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. New York: Routledge. pp. 108-118 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Here I pursue two main aims: (1) to articulate and defend a Kantian conception of duties to self, and (2) to explore the ramifications of such duties for the moral justification of paternalism. I conclude that there is a distinctive reason to resent paternalistic intercessions aimed at assisting others in fulfilling their duties to self (or the self-regarding virtues necessary thereunto), based on the fact that the goods realized via their fulfillment are historical, i.e., their value depends on an individual's casual contribution to their fulfillment.

Author's Profile

Michael Cholbi
University of Edinburgh

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-04-19

Downloads
428 (#44,120)

6 months
127 (#35,160)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?