Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia

Episteme 13 (4):397-422 (2016)
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We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing.
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First archival date: 2016-03-12
Latest version: 5 (2021-08-13)
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