Epistemology of disagreement: The good news

Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217 (2007)
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Abstract

How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.

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David Christensen
Brown University

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