The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg

In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 357-382 (2016)
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This paper considers an argument from Rosenberg (Thinking about Knowing, 2002) that truth is not and cannot be the aim of belief. Here, I reconstruct what I take to be the most well worked out version of this idea tracing back to Rorty and Davidson. In response, I also distinguish two things the truth-aim could be: a goal regulating our executable epistemic conduct and an end which determines the types of evaluation, susceptibility to which is partially constitutive of what a belief is.
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The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.

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