Experiential holism in time

Mind and Language 37 (4):619-637 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Temporally extended experiences, experiential holists have it, are not reducible to successions of their temporal parts because some whole experiences determine their parts (in some way). This paper suggests, first, that some forms of experiential holism are in fact consistent with the rival atomist view (that experiences are successions of their parts) and, second, that the main reasons advanced for experiential holism are compatible with atomism too. The paper then looks at how holistic determination of its parts by a whole experience might take place in time, arguing that it is either inconsistent or undermines widespread assumptions regarding the mechanisms underlying experiences.

Author's Profile

Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-30

Downloads
62 (#88,683)

6 months
23 (#89,869)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?