The Nature of Intuitive Justification

Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333 (2011)
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Abstract
In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it occurs perception, and I make a case for thinking that it is present in a wide variety of logical, mathematical, and philosophical intuitions.
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Archival date: 2017-02-02
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Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins

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