Uma Abordagem Bayesiana ao Paradoxo do Prefácio

Intuitio 11 (1):p.65-76 (2018)
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Abstract

Is logic a normative science for reasoning? Do its principles play any role in the rationality of our beliefs? Being logically consistent is supposed to be a principle for the theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, it seems that logical consistency imposes a constraint on rational belief. However, the preface paradox puts this principle to the test, since the ‘state of preface’ would be a rational state. We will present an analysis according to a Bayesian model of degrees of belief in order to exemplify a (dis)solution of the paradox and, simultaneously, the maintenance of the principle of consistency.

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Samuel Basso Cibils
Feevale University Basic Education School

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