Grundlagen §64: An Alternative Strategy to Account for Second-Order Abstraction

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (2):183-204 (2022)
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Abstract

A famous passage in Section 64 of Frege’s Grundlagen may be seen as a justification for the truth of abstraction principles. The justification is grounded in the procedureofcontent recarvingwhich Frege describes in the passage. In this paper I argue that Frege’sprocedure of content recarving while possibly correct in the case of first-order equivalencerelations is insufficient to grant the truth of second-order abstractions. Moreover, I propose apossible way of justifying second-order abstractions by referring to the operation of contentrecarving and I show that the proposal relies to a certain extent on the Basic Law V. Therefore,if we are to justify the truth of second-order abstractions by invoking the content recarvingprocedure we are committed to a special status of some instances of the Basic Law V and thusto a special status of extensions of concepts as abstract objects

Author Profiles

Vincenzo Ciccarelli
University of Venice
Vincenzo Ciccarelli
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

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