Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense against Arguments From Evil

Faith and Philosophy 32 (3):247-270 (2015)
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This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. This epistemic possibility decisively undermines a key premise of both logical and evidential arguments from evil.
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