Assertion, Belief, and Context

Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper argues for a treatment of belief as essentially sensitive to certain features of context. The first part gives an argument that we must take belief to be context-sensitive in the same way that assertion is, if we are to preserve appealing principles tying belief to sincere assertion. In particular, whether an agent counts as believing that p in a context depends on the space of alternative possibilities the agent is considering in that context. One and the same doxastic state may amount to belief that p in one context but not another. The second part of the paper gives a formal treatment of doxastic states, according to which belief is context-sensitive along just these lines. The model is applied to characterize (but not to refute) skeptical arguments.
Reprint years
2018
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CLAABA
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-05-03
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-05-03

Total views
113 ( #20,371 of 38,072 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #21,537 of 38,072 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.