Are Credences Different From Beliefs?

In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell (forthcoming)
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This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the compatibility of the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them.

Author Profiles

Roger Clarke
Queen's University, Belfast
Julia Staffel
University of Colorado, Boulder


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