Debunking and Dispensability

In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In his précis of a recent book, Richard Joyce writes, “My contention…is that…any epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to moral beliefs…will be neutralized by the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere…presupposes their truth.” Such reasoning – falling under the heading “Genealogical Debunking Arguments” – is now commonplace. But how might “the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere… presupposes” the truth of our moral beliefs “neutralize” whatever “epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to” them? In this article, I argue that there appears to be no satisfactory answer to this question. The problem is quite general, applying to all arguments with the structure of Genealogical Debunking Arguments aimed at realism about a domain meeting two conditions. The Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical realism affords an important special case
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-07-10
Latest version: 3 (2015-12-18)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Quine, Willard V. O.
The Myth of Morality.Lillehammer, Hallvard

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Modal Objectivity.Justin, Clarke-Doane
Objectivity and Reliability.Clarke-Doane, Justin
Immoral Realism.Hayward, Max Khan

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
845 ( #3,460 of 47,105 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
160 ( #2,952 of 47,105 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.