Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CLAKAT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-03-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-06-02

Total views
336 ( #20,645 of 65,539 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #11,238 of 65,539 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.