Knowledge and the Objection to Religious Belief from Cognitive Science

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A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather different adaptive purposes. This paper begins with an overview of the pertinent cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then present two different ways in which this research can be formulated into an argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works
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Archival date: 2018-03-14
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Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology.Andrew Moon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):879-891.
Is Supernatural Belief Unreliably Formed.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-24.

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