True Blame

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Abstract
A true-emotion view of blameworthiness holds that one is blameworthy for an offense just in case one is a fitting target of a blaming emotion in response to that offense, and a blaming emotion is fitting just in case it truly represents things. Proportionality requires that fitting blame be of the right size, neither an overreaction nor an underreaction to the offense. Here it is argued that this requirement makes trouble for a true-emotion view. Instances of blaming emotions can differ in size, and can thus differ with respect to whether they are proportional, without differing in the representations that true-emotion theorists attribute to them. The option of attributing further representations to blaming emotions, with the aim of avoiding this objection, is considered and shown to raise new difficulties for the view.
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CLATB-3
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Archival date: 2022-01-10
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2022-01-10

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