Wiggins on Practical Knowledge

Disputatio 8 (42):113-124 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Wiggins’ (2012) argument against propositional accounts of knowing how is based on a development of some considerations taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argued that the knowledge needed for participation in an ethos cannot be codified in propositional form so as to let it be imparted to someone who did not already have it. This is because any putative codification would be incomplete, and require that knowledge in order to extend it to novel cases. On a reasonable interpretation of his argument, Wiggins claims that the same goes for practical knowledge in general, and that this shows that a propositional view of knowing how is incorrect. This paper shows that this argument is unsound.

Author's Profile

Henry Clarke
University College London (PhD)

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-08-14

Downloads
500 (#30,052)

6 months
66 (#57,705)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?