Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

Dissertation, (2018)
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In this dissertation, I argue for a new conception of the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
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Archival date: 2018-09-08
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Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan

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