The Enkratic Requirement

European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
: Agents are enkratic when they intend to do what they believe they should. That rationality requires you to be enkratic is uncontroversial, yet you may be enkratic in a way that does not exhibit any rationality on your part. Thus, what I call the enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic in the right way. In particular, I will argue that it demands that you base your belief about what you should do and your intention to do it on the same considerations. The idea is that, if you base your belief and your intention on different considerations, then you are inconsistent in your treatment of those considerations as reasons. The enkratic requirement demands that you be enkratic by treating considerations consistently as reasons
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
COATER
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-02-28
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Why Be Rational.Kolodny, Niko
Reasons as Evidence.Kearns, Stephen & Star, Daniel

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Normativity of Rationality.Kiesewetter, Benjamin

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2011-02-07

Total views
607 ( #6,236 of 49,983 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #12,917 of 49,983 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.