Strong, therefore sensitive: Misgivings about derose’s contextualism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):237-253 (2012)
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According to an influential contextualist solution to skepticism advanced by Keith DeRose, denials of skeptical hypotheses are, in most contexts, strong yet insensitive. The strength of such denials allows for knowledge of them, thus undermining skepticism, while the insensitivity of such denials explains our intuition that we do not know them. In this paper we argue that, under some well-motivated conditions, a negated skeptical hypothesis is strong only if it is sensitive. We also consider how a natural response on behalf of DeRose appears to be equally available to his primary rival (viz., the sensitivity theorist).

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Jeffrey W. Roland
Louisiana State University


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