Deliberating in the presence of manipulation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105 (2018)
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Abstract
According to deliberation compatibilism, rational deliberation is compatible with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined by factors beyond one’s control. This paper offers a counterexample to recent accounts of rational deliberation that entail deliberation compatibilism. The counterexample involves a deliberator who believes that whichever action she performs will be the result of deterministic manipulation. It is further argued that there is no relevant difference between the purported counterexample and ordinary doxastic circumstances in which a determinist deliberates.
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2017, 2018
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Archival date: 2018-05-16
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References found in this work BETA
Free Will and Luck.Mele, Alfred R.
Causation: A User’s Guide.Paul, L. A. & Hall, Ned

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2017-06-17

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