Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument

Philosophical Papers 44 (2):165-187 (2015)
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Abstract
Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig's argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future. Craig disagrees. I show that Craig's reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem to support the impossibility of an endless future
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Archival date: 2018-05-16
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