Rationality and Truth

In Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In this paper we defend our version of the traditional view and argue against Williamson’s alternative.

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Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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