The Two-Stage Model of Emotion and the Interpretive Structure of the Mind
Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):291-320 (2008)
Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily
responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account
of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general
theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses
precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual
arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of
bodily responses is inadequate. I offer an alternative model, according to which responses
(physical states) are perceived and interpreted by a separate cognitive process, one
that assigns meaning to those responses. The non-conscious appraisal process and the
interpretive process are distinct, hence a two-stage model of emotion. This model is
related to Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory. Their often-discussed experiment
showed that interpretation can play a role in producing emotions. But they do not show
that interpretation is necessary for producing emotions in general, outside of the experimental
conditions that generated unexplained arousal in subjects. My two-stage model
supports this stronger claim by situating the interpretive process in a comprehensive
model of emotion.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
COHTTM
Upload history
Archival date: 2011-08-16
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-08-16
Total views
405 ( #12,799 of 56,034 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #28,495 of 56,034 )
2011-08-16
Total views
405 ( #12,799 of 56,034 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #28,495 of 56,034 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.