Virtue Ethics and the Demands of Social Morality

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 236-260 (2014)
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Abstract

Building on work by Steve Darwall, I argue that standard virtue ethical accounts of moral motivation are defective because they don't include accounts of social morality. I then propose a virtue ethical account of social morality, and respond to one of Darwall's core objections to the coherence of any such (non-Kantian) account.

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Bradford Cokelet
University of Kansas

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