Autonomy-minded Anti-perfectionism
Journal of Philosophical Research 37:233-241 (2012)
Abstract
John Patrick Rudisill purports to identify various problems with my argument that the state promotion of autonomy is consistent with anti-perfectionism, viz., that it falsely pretends to be novel, is unacceptably counterintuitive because too restrictive and too permissive, and that it deploys a self-defeating formal apparatus. I argue, in reply, that my argument is more novel than Rudisill gives me credit for; that properly understood my anti-perfectionism implies neither the implausible restrictions nor the unpalatable permissions that Rudisill claims; and that my formal apparatus is innocent of the flaws imputed to it.
Keywords
Categories
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
1053-8364
PhilPapers/Archive ID
COLAAN-6
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-10-18
View other versions
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-11-01
Total views
66 ( #45,518 of 57,074 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #55,106 of 57,074 )
2013-11-01
Total views
66 ( #45,518 of 57,074 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #55,106 of 57,074 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.