Empirical justification and defeasibility

Synthese:1-16 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.
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COMEJA
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Archival date: 2018-12-28
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2018-07-09

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