Evidence of evidence is evidence

Analysis 75 (4):557-559 (2015)
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Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.

Author Profiles

Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick
Eyal Tal
University of Arizona (PhD)


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