Epistemic Injustice in the space of reasons

Episteme 12 (1):75-93 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view requires expansion and revision in light of Mills' concept of 'epistemologies of ignorance'. I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each others' weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic ignorance and false belief.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
CONEII-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-04-09
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
White Ignorance.Mills, Charles

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-04-08

Total views
708 ( #3,751 of 43,694 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
116 ( #4,060 of 43,694 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.