Moral luck, control, and the bases of desert

Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):455-461 (2002)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
If we want to see justice done with regard to responsibility, then we must either (i) allow that people are never morally responsible, (iia) show that luck is not ubiquitous or at least that (iib) ubiquitous luck is not moral, or (iii) show that ascriptions of responsibility can retain justice despite the omnipresence of luck. This paper defends (iii); ascriptions of responsibility can be just even though luck is ubiquitous.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-03-07
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
258 ( #25,484 of 64,107 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #24,317 of 64,107 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.