Abstract

This study brings together two thinkers whose work illustrates the idea of mental life as a kind of vital striving, Thomas Aquinas and Edith Stein. On the side of Aquinas, whereas his theory of intentionality has often been understood in quasi-semantic terms, as cognitive act's reference to or signification of something, in reality it is better understood as a kind of vital striving toward the cognitive object. Stein, for her part, famously develops the notion of a living "I," which I argue reflects many of these same insights. The study does not make any claims about historical influence (even though Stein is well-known to be familiar with Aquinas's cognitive theory). Rather, its goal is to open up the possibility for recasting intentionality in teleological terms, as a striving for some good—while also having implications for the history of intentionality, by opening up new interpretive possibilities.