La Ley y El Orden: Sobre Dos Sorprendentes (¡y Extendidos!) Errores En la Enseñanza de Las Ciencias Naturales

Anales de la Asociación Química Argentina 109 (Número extra):223-229 (2022)
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It does not seem particularly daring to say that one objective of science education is to enable students to understand different phenomena in the world in their mutual relationship. This is roughly equivalent to promoting knowledge of scientific explanations, which involve resorting to regular relationships between certain phenomena and which, certainly, is different from knowledge of this or that type of event taken in isolation. In this text, we will draw attention to two opposing tendencies that, however, tend towards the common result of hindering the achievement of such an objective. On the one hand, we find characterizations of scientific explanation that assimilate it to argumentation and, therefore, lose sight of what specifically makes explanations explanatory; that is, they ask too little of a scientific explanation. On the other hand, those that consider paradigmatic cases of scientific explanation −such as those achieved by subsuming phenomena such as tides to Newton's laws− do not really constitute explanations but merely descriptions; it is about asking too much of an explanation here. We will therefore point out that a greater attention to the elaborations provided by the philosophy of science about the notion of explanation is crucial to better serve educational purposes.

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