Abstract

Many relational egalitarians presume that social equality requires respecting the autonomy of all equally. Yet, on many readings, autonomous agential choices and social equality can conflict: it seems possible for someone to autonomously endorse social inequalities. In this paper, I show how the debates between relational autonomy theorists hold important lessons for relational egalitarians. I distinguish three ways of conceptualizing the relation between the two theoretical families to consider how to resolve this apparent tension. First, one could argue that social equality is instrumental to secure relational autonomy. Second, one could adopt a deontic position stating that what matters is to respect the choices and commitments that persons can endorse reflexively. Thirdly, one could argue that (some) egalitarian socio-political relations are constitutive of autonomy. I argue that relational egalitarians should prefer this final constitutive view to reconcile equality and autonomy. This constitutive approach means that relational egalitarians should focus on the external, structural conditions that should exist in society to guarantee a substantive level of personal autonomy.