Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged

Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):435-451 (2023)
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The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Author Profiles

Alessandro Cecconi
University of Geneva
Damiano Costa
Università della Svizzera Italiana


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