Shadows of consciousness: the problem of phenomenal properties

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The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content of experience and from this the ground of the distinction between phenomenal and representational properties is identified.
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First archival date: 2014-04-10
Latest version: 2 (2015-06-04)
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