No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260 (2014)
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Abstract
Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that composition is identity and noting its consequences for the question of mereological structure
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Archival date: 2013-06-11
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Against Parthood.Sider, Theodore

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Ordinary Objects.Korman, Daniel Z.

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