Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism

Ethics 127 (4):821-851 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In this article I assess Rossian Intuitionism, which is the view that the Rossian Principles of Duty are self-evident. I begin by motivating and clarifying a version of the view—Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism—that hasn’t been adequately considered by Rossians. After defending it against a series of significant objections, I show that enthusiasm for Rossian Conceptual Intuitionism should be muted. Specifically, I argue that we lack sufficient reason for thinking that the Rossian Principles are self-evident, and that insisting that they are self-evident may commit Rossians to radically expanding the scope of self-evidence.
No keywords specified (fix it)
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-06-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
351 ( #12,610 of 50,155 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #13,479 of 50,155 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.