The Way of Actuality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):231-247 (2014)
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In this paper, I defend an indexical analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction within the framework of modal realism. This analysis holds the abstract-concrete distinction to be conceptually inseparable from the distinction between the actual and the merely possible, which is assumed to be indexical in nature. The resulting view contributes to the case for modal realism by demonstrating how its distinctive resources provide a reductive analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction. This indexical analysis also provides a solution to a sceptical problem regarding our concreteness, which parallels the sceptical problem that motivates indexicalism about actuality.

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Sam Cowling
Denison University


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