In Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 101-7 (2011)
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Is a rational dispute over the validity of a fundamental logical law possible? In his lecture ‘Logics and Metalogics’, Timothy Williamson criticizes Dummett’s approach to this problem and maintains that a semantic theory does not provide a way of settling disputes over the validity of fundamental logical laws. I argue that Dummett’s view is different from the view criticized by Williamson. Dummett does not think that a semantic theory alone can settle a dispute over the validity of a fundamental logical law. Such disputes, according to Dummett, should be settled by the theory of meaning. A semantic theory in the sense that is usual among logicians is a theory of logical consequence . A meaning theory is a theory of understanding .
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