Abstract
Philosophy in the 20th century began and ended with an obsession with the problems of consciousness.
But the specific problems discussed at each end of the century were very different,
and reflection on how these differences developed will illuminate not just our understanding of the
history of philosophy of consciousness, but also our understanding of consciousness itself.
An interest in the problems of consciousness can be found in at least three movements in
early 20th century philosophy: in the discussions of perception and realism by G.E. Moore and
Bertrand Russell; in the related discussions of realism and pragmatism in America, in the period
between William James and C.I. Lewis; and in the phenomenological movement started by Edmund
Husserl. Two common themes in all these movements are: (i) that consciousness is a central
or defining feature of the mind, and (ii) consciousness and thought (or intentionality) are interrelated
phenomena not to be discussed in isolation from one another. The problem of consciousness in
those days was the problem of the nature of our access to the mind-independent world.