All the Difference in the World

Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):1-25 (1991)
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Abstract
The celebrated "Twin Earth" arguments of Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge (1979) aim to establish that some intentional states logically depend on facts external to the subjects of those states. Ascriptions of states of these kinds to a thinker entail that the thinker's environment is a certain way. It is not possible that the thinker could be in those very intentional states unless the environment is that way...
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1991
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Wittgensteinian Content‐Externalism.Ben Sorgiovanni - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Talk and Thought.Sarah Sawyer - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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