Synthese 170 (2):211-15 (
2009)
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Abstract
Jerry Fodor, by common agreement, is one of the world’s leading philosophers. At the
forefront of the cognitive revolution since the 1960s, his work has determined much of
the research agenda in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology for
well over 40 years. This special issue dedicated to his work is intended both as a tribute
to Fodor and as a contribution to the fruitful debates that his work has generated.
One philosophical thesis that has dominated Fodor’s work since the 1960s is realism
about the mental. Are there really mental states, events and processes? From his
first book, Psychological Explanation (1968), onwards, Fodor has always answered
this question with a resolute yes. From his early rejection of Wittgensteinian and
behaviourist conceptions of the mind, to his later disputes with philosophers of mind
of the elminativist ilk, he has always been opposed to views that try to explain
away mental phenomena. On his view, there are minds, and minds can change the
world.