The Mental States of Persons and their Brains
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270 (2015)
Abstract
Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.
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2015-07-12
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2015-07-12
Total views
465 ( #15,868 of 69,167 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #33,791 of 69,167 )
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