Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought
In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oup Usa. pp. 156 (2013)
Abstract
We call our thoughts conscious, and we also say the same of our bodily sensations,
perceptions and other sensory experiences. But thoughts and sensory experiences are
very different phenomena, both from the point of view of their subject and in their
functional or cognitive role. Does this mean, then, that there are very different kinds
or varieties of consciousness? Philosophers do often talk about different kinds of
consciousness: Christopher Hill, for example, claims that ‘it is customary to
distinguish five forms of consciousness’ (Hill 2009: 1). These are: agent
consciousness, propositional consciousness, introspective consciousness, relational
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness; to which Hill adds experiential
consciousness, making six in total.
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