El interés de orden superior en la disponibilidad de la propia vida y la prioridad de la libertad. Una evaluación del equilibrio reflexivo de la justice as fairness de Rawls

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the reflective equilibrium between the acknowledgment of the right to end one’s life and the Rawlsian idea of freedom. This article evaluates the possibility of a self-destructive exercise of freedom. It is asserted that this kind of exercise is inconsistent with the highest order interest in freedom. Allowing the self-destructive practice of freedom jeopardizes the Rawlsian foundation of the priority of liberty, a crucial aspect of the justice as fairness. || El presente artículo tiene como objetivo evaluar el equilibrio reflexivo entre el reconocimiento al derecho a disponer de la propia vida y la idea rawlsiana de libertad. Se considera la posibilidad de llevar a cabo un ejercicio autodestructivo de la libertad. Se defiende que este tipo de ejercicios son contrarios al interés de orden supremo en ejercer la libertad. Permitir la práctica autodestructiva de la libertad pone en riesgo la fundamentación rawlsiana de la prioridad de la libertad, un elemento central de la justice as fairness.
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Archival date: 2018-10-09
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2018-10-09

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