So-labeled neo-fregeanism

Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279 (1993)
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Abstract
I explain and criticize a theory of beliefs and of belief sentences offered by Graeme Forbes. My main criticism will be directed at Forbes' idea that, as a matter of the semantic rules of belief reporting -- as a matter of the meaning of belief ascriptions -- to get at the subject's way of thinking in an attitude ascription, we must use expressions that are "linguistic counterparts" of the subject's expressions. I think we often do something like that, but that we have other, equally good methods of getting at ways of thinking; so what is wanted is a more inclusive characterization of the rules of belief reporting by which we manage to do it -- a characterization more along the lines of: anything goes.
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Talk About Beliefs.Crimmins, Mark
Talk About Beliefs.Boer, Steven E. & Crimmins, Mark

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