Nativist Models of the Mind

Gnosis 9 (3):1-22 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I give a defense of the Massive Modularity hypothesis: the view that the mind is composed of discrete, encapsulated, informationally isolated computational structures dedicated to particular problem domains. This view contrasts with Psychological Rationalism: the view that mental structures take the form of unencapsulated representational items, all available as inputs to one domain-general computational processor. I argue that although Psychological Rationalism is in principle able to overcome the `intractability objection', the view must borrow many features of a massively modular architecture in order to do so, that although it can, in principle, overcome the `optimality objection', the way it does so does not correlate with the way we think, and that although it can, in principle, respond to the `argument from biology', it cannot do so without advancing an unrealistic and unsupported account of cognitive evolution.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-05-04
Latest version: 2 (2021-05-11)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
35 ( #59,830 of 64,251 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #60,584 of 64,251 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.